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Florida Law Review
VOLUMlE 42

JANUARY 1990

NUMBER 1

UNDERSTANDING DIVERSITY*
Sharon Elizabeth Rush**
Difference is not something which is intrinsic in the "different" person, but rather the product of a comparison.

Professor Martha Minow'
our 2

Diversifying
law school faculties is a critical goal that needs
our efforts and attention. Imagine a group of forty to fifty outstanding
legal scholars, consisting equally of women and men, people of color
and whites, liberals and conservatives, people from disadvantaged and
affluent backgrounds, handicapped and able-bodied people, Jews and
non-Jews, younger and older individuals, and so forth. Now imagine
that each member of this group also is an outstanding teacher and
colleague and that the group represents a typical law school faculty
in this country. Impossible? I do not think so, but much needs to be
done if we are going to achieve this goal.

*@1990. All rights reserved.
**Professor, University of Florida College of Law. B.A. 1974, J.D. 1980, Cornell University.
My gratitude to the FloridaLaw Review and Dean Jeffrey E. Lewis for planning and sponsoring
this Symposium. Mary Jane Boswell, Patricia Bradford, Iris Burke, Barbara Child, Anthony
Cook, Barry Currier, Nancy Dowd, Alyson Flournoy, Liz McCulloch, John Merryman, Marty
Peters, Anne Rutledge, Ann Scales, and Walter Weyrauch read and commented on earlier
versions of my essay and provided invaluable suggestions and support. Wendy Leavitt and
Donna Griffin, my research assistants, did an excellent job finding support for the comments I
had made. I also am thankful to the Symposium participants who were late in sending the
Florida Law Review drafts of their manuscripts from which I was to prepare the "proper"
introduction. I am incapable of describing the richness of the participants' thoughts. On the
other hand, I am pretty good at provoking thought, and what I say is not easy, for me, or
perhaps for the reader. But I speak with a genuine affection for my colleagues.
1. Minow, All the Difference: Three Lessons in Equality, Neutrality, and Tolerance, 39
DE PAUL L. REV. 1, 3 (1989).
2. I use the pronoun "we" throughout my essay to refer primarily to members of law school
communities in this country. Occasionally, I speak specifically to a smaller group and have tried
to make that clear in context. I recognize that speaking about groups lends itself to overincisiveness or underinclusiveness, and I am sure I am vulnerable to this criticism. Still, I agree
with recent efforts by many scholars to avoid making assumptions that what is being said
necessarily applies to the reader or even to everyone defined within a group. See Scheppele,
Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2077 (1989).
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The concept of diversity varies in meaning for different situations
or even for different people in the same situation. To speak meaningfully of diversity, we must define it. What does it mean, for example,
to have a diverse law school faculty? "Diverse from what or in what
sense?" seems an appropriate, fundamental question. Trying to understand what diversity means or should mean with respect to law school
faculties is the focus of this essay.
My thoughts in this area are not meant to be definitive. Rather,
they are intended to inspire us to think about what we are trying to
achieve in our hiring goals. My highest priority, and undoubtedly
yours also, is to hire people who will be excellent scholars, teachers,
and colleagues. In attempting to achieve diversity, therefore, I think
we also should remain committed to excellence. I think it is possible
to achieve both, and my comments are a modest effort to share with
you my thoughts on how we might strive toward our goals.
"Diversity" can be defined at least three different ways: facial
diversity, hardship diversity, and ideological diversity. Undoubtedly,
more possibilities, and even better names for those possibilities I have
chosen, exist, but these three terms highlight many of the misunderstandings that can arise absent a common definition. I will explain
what I mean by these terms and then try to persuade you that facial
diversity should be the focus of our present hiring goals.
My definition of "facial diversity" is simple, perhaps too simple. A
group is facially diverse if it includes members who are not all of one
race and gender. With respect to law school faculties, which are comprised primarily of white men,3 facial diversity is achieved by adding
4
men of color and women.
3. Chused, The Hiring and Retention of Minorities and Women on American Law School
Faculties, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 537, 538 (1988) ("In 1986-87, a typical law school faculty had
thirty one [sic] members... ; thirty were white and one was black, Hispanic, or other minority;
twenty-six were men and five were women.") (footnotes omitted).
4. My essay focuses primarily upon women, because "Women in the 1990s" is the theme
of this Symposium. Much of what I say, however, also applies to men of color. Throughout my
paper I use the phrase, "men of color and women." In the broader category of women, therefore,
are women of color and white women. In speaking of us as a group, I do not mean to undermine
the significance and importance of race. Women of color, especially, must struggle to overcome
discrimination. See B. HOOKS, AIN'T I A WOMAN: BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM (1981)
("Contemporary black women could not join together to fight for women's rights because we
did not see 'womenhood' as an important aspect of our identity. Racist, sexist socialization had
conditioned us to devalue our femaleness ....
We were asked to deny a part of ourselves and we did."); Kline, Race, Racism and Feminist Legal Theory, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 115,
121 (1989) ("[Women of color] find it difficult, if not impossible, to separate experiences they
attribute to their gender from experiences they attribute to their race, class[,] or other characteristics."). Later in my essay, my focus will shift briefly to race, and I use the phrase "people
of color and white women" because much of what I say also applies to white women.
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Naturally, facial diversity is a matter of degree. For example, we
could characterize the Supreme Court Justices as a facially diverse
group, although. only minimally so. Although the presence of Justices
O'Connor and Marshall on the Court evidences some social commitment
to facial diversity, the fact that she is the only woman and he is the
only man of color in our history who have been asked and are authorized to speak, as Justices, from the most venerated halls of American jurisprudence also indicates the superficiality of our nation's commitment to facial diversity. Tokenism looks good, fair, and democratic.
Tokenism has become the American way. Sadly, law school faculties
are not far removed from this picture.2
Diversity also might be defined more broadly. It could include
hardship characteristics. "Hardship diversity," as I define it, includes
people whose lives are more difficult and who, as groups, generally
do not share in the power structure because of various attributes or
characteristics (other than being a man of color or a woman) they
have that deviate from normative standards. For example, poor
people, working-class people, non-Christians, handicapped persons,
homosexuals, the elderly, and many others outside the dominant and
powerful groups in our society would fit this definition.
Moreover, characteristics that make these people "outsiders" also
may be facially apparent or easily discernible, as they would be with
some handicaps, for example. Other hardship characteristics may be
unapparent, particularly from a rdsumd, and may remain hidden unless
the person chooses to make them known. For example, identifying
potential law school faculty members who come from-poor or workingclass backgrounds may be difficult. 6
Arguably, a definition that extends to hardships nevertheless continues to be too narrow in scope. For example, perhaps diversity
should mean adding people to the faculty who have ideological perspectives that vary from most other faculty members'. Under this defini-

5. See Chused, supra note 3, at 539 ("Racial tokenism is alive and well at American law
schools.').
6. Looking at my r~sum6, for example, one might get the impression that I come from a
"privileged" background because I attended Cornell University. In many ways my precollege
life was privileged, but not if "privilege" is measured by household income. I was able to attend
Cornell only because the school provided free tuition to the children of blue-collar workers with
at least 10 years of service to the university. For those readers who have visited Ithaca, perhaps
you can imagine the schizophrenia I felt as I trudged up the hill everyday to study with some
of the most gifted teachers and mingle with some of the wealthiest students in the country.
This experience was followed by a lonely walk home in the evening to the warmth and love of
my family whose day only really began at the dinner table.
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tion, which I would label "ideological diversity," the addition of just
one critical legal studies scholar to most law school faculties would be
a step toward diversification.
These definitions of facial, hardship, and ideological diversity are
not exclusive, and, in fact, overlap in many ways. 7 Some women, for
example, struggle to overcome bias against them because of their
religious preferences or sexual orientation.8 Frequently, women suffer
discrimination in the workplace because of their decisions to postpone
careers until their family lives are established. 9 More and more women
are interested in studying and pursuing a feminist perspective in law,
a nontraditional approach to legal analysis.1° Thus, one woman could
fit into all three of my definitions of diversity.
Because the definitions of diversity are not exclusive, the way we
define diversity will depend upon the goals we are trying to achieve.
What are we trying to achieve through diversification of our faculties?
For me, the ultimate goal is to obtain the ideal faculty that I described
at the beginning of my essay. I believe we should start to achieve
diversity in its fullest sense by focusing on facial diversity, that is,
by hiring more men of color and women.
Facial diversity is my immediate priority for a number of reasons.
First, sex and race discrimination, accusations of lack of credibility,
and the oppression of men of color and women are all around us.
Indeed, affirmative action philosophies and plans are the offspring of
this history and reality.,,

7. In fact, given the white male hegemony, it may be impossible to separate the consequences of being a woman from being a black woman with an economically underprivileged
background. See, e.g., Crenshaw, Race, Reform, andRetrenchment: Transformationand Legitimation in AntidiscriminationLaw, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1369-87 (1988) (analysis of the
overlap between racism and hegemony). Certainly, my attempts here to speak separately of
basic characteristics of certain groups is simplistic. Nevertheless, my goal is to provide some
common understanding of diversity - even if just on the most fundamental level.
8. For a sensitive and insightful comparative analysis of the similarities between religious
persecution of Jews and the social and political persecution of gays and lesbians, see Boswell,
Jews, Bicycle Riders, and Gay People: The Determinationof Social Consensus and Its Impact
on Minorities, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMANITIES 205 (1989).
9. See Dowd, Work andFamily: The Gender Paradoxand the Limitations of Discrimination
Analysis in Restructuring the Workplace, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 79 (1989).
10. This Symposium and others at various law schools, see, e.g., Feminism in the Law:
Theory, Practiceand Criticism., 1989 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, are some evidence of the increasing
interest in feminist scholarship.

11.

See L. TRIBE,

AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

§ 16-22 (2d ed. 1988); Colker, Anti-

Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003 (1986);
Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71
VA. L. REV. 753 (1985).
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Moreover, it seems that some of the progress we have made is
being undone.1 The reports by Ricki Tannen'3 and Lynn Schafran4
on the Report of the Florida Supreme Court Gender Bias Commission,
as well as the comments by Martha Barnett, 5 evidence many of the
problems women face as practitioners and litigants in our justice system. As disheartening as some of their findings and experiences are,
however, their efforts to gather the data and share it with the legal
community should inspire us. We need empirical evidence to make
our stories credible.16 We need those who are committed to feminist
and "outsider" jurisprudence 17 to tell their stories so that we can better
understand the issues and problems facing men of color and women

within the existing legal structure.

12. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (women's
right to abortion restricted); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (affirmative action set-aside hiring policies based upon race restricted). For thoughtful and critical
discussions of recent restrictions of women's reproductive freedom and the backsliding of achievements made with respect to civil rights, see Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court 1988 Term Foreword:The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARv. L. REV. 43 (1989); Olsen, UnravelingCompromise, 103 HARV. L. REV. 105 (1989). The recent killings of 14 female engineering students
at Montreal University by a gunman who attributed his problems to "feminists" are an unpleasant
and awesome reminder that being a feminist can carry grave risks. Gunman Kills 14 Women
at Montreal University: Killer Targets 'Feminists,' Commits Suicide, Wash. Post, Dec. 7, 1989,
at A41, col. 1. We also are reminded almost daily of racial incidents occurring around the
country. For example, a Hispanic policeman recently was convicted of manslaughter for killing
a black motorcyclist and his passenger. City officials feared an acquittal would result in city-wide
riots. Miami Braces for Possibility of Verdict Riot, Wash. Post, Dec. 7, 1989, at A8, col. 1.
13.

See

THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT GENDER BIAS STUDY COMMISSION, REPORT

OF THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT GENDER BIAS STUDY COMMISSION (1990), published in
42 FLA. L. REV. - (forthcoming 1990) (reported by Ricki Lewis Tanen). Ms. Tannen also
has written an essay for this Symposium issue concerning the historical roots of gender bias.
See Tannen, Setting the Agenda for the 1990s: The Historical Foundationsof Gender Bias in
the Law: A Context for Reconstruction, 42 FLA. L. REV. 163 (1990). Ms. Tannen, the reporter
of the Florida Supreme Court Gender Bias Study Commission, received her law degree from
the University of Florida College of Law. See id. n.*.
14. See Schafran, Gender Bias: Floridaand the Nation, 42 FLA. L. REV. 181 (1990). Ms.
Schafran is the Director of the National Education Program to Promote Equality for Women
and Men in the Courts and was advisor to the Florida Supreme Court Gender Bias Study
Commission. She received her law degree from Columbia University. See id. at n.*.
15. See Barnett, Women PracticingLaw: Changes in Attitudes, Changes in Platitudes,42
FLA. L. REV. 209 (1990). Ms. Barnett was the first female lawyer at Holland & Knight. Id.
at 211. She received her law degree from the University of Florida College of Law. Id. at n.*.
16. Storytelling is becoming increasingly important in legal scholarship and has become a
primary way for feminist scholars, scholars of color, and other "outsiders" to try to relate our
experiences to the law. See generally Symposium: Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073
(1989) (exploring the role of storytelling in diversifying legal scholarship).
17. See Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87
MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2323 (1989) (using the term "outsider jurisprudence").
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Consequently, hiring men of color and women remedies some of
the harm that has been done to us "outsiders." Significantly, every
woman shares with every other woman, at some point and however
temporary, the diminution of her self because she is not a man. (Undoubtedly, people of color also can lay claim to this as compared to
whites.) Just being a member of one of the largest disfavored groups
in our society diminishes a woman. Her gender may be the only "outsider" characteristic she has, but this fact alone may impede her ability
to be accepted as an equal by her male colleagues.
To illustrate, compare Justice O'Connor's path to the Supreme
Court with that of Chief Justice Rehnquist's. Both graduated from
Stanford Law School in 1952.18 Justice O'Connor's degree immediately
earned her a position as stenographer at some law firms. 19 Fortunately,
she also was offered a position as a clerk for a district attorney, which
she accepted.2- In contrast, Justice Rehnquist's Stanford law degree
immediately qualified him for a United States Supreme Court
clerkship, 21 followed by an associate's position with a prestigious law
firm.- Even today, Justice O'Connor continues to experience the derision of her fellow Justices because some of her opinions do not coincide with their views of what she should be saying because she is a
woman. For example, Justice Scalia's concurrence in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services- is little more than a personal affront to the
intellect of Justice O'Connor, seemingly based upon her sex.2

18. 2 ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, 1, 13 (1989) [hereinafter ALMANAC].
19. Rinzler, How Women Lawyers Made Their Case, Wash. Post, Nov. 23, 1986, Book
World Section, at 10, col. 1-4.
20. Id.
21. He clerked for Justice Robert Jackson from 1952 to 1953. See ALMANAC, supra note
18, at 1.
22. Id. Following his clerkship with Justice Jackson, Chief Justice Rehnquist joined the
firm of Evans, Kitchel & Jenckes in Phoenix, Arizona. Id.
23. 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3065 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment).
24. My colleague, Professor Walter Weyrauch, first brought this fact to my attention.
Occasionally, a Justice's opinion sharply and even acerbically criticizes another Justice for his
or her differing view, particularly when the difference affects the outcome of the case. In fact,
Justice Blackmun accused the Webster plurality of "invit[ing] charges of cowardice and illegitimacy to [the Court's] door." Id. at 3079 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
But Justice Scalia's "attack" on Justice O'Connor went much further than the occasional "bashing"
among Justices. For example, in his opinion, Justice Scalia focused his remarks directly on
Justice O'Connor, and he seemed especially disturbed that she did not vote to reconsider Roe
v. Wade. Id. at 3064 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment). Significantly,
however, neither did any of the other Justices. Chief Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion,
joined by Justices Kennedy and White, discussed overruling Roe, but ultimately decided that
Webster was not the case that raised that question. Id. at 3058 (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality
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Moreover, whenever a woman joins the dominant group, her status
as a woman counts toward diversity. Ironically, this move can be a
disadvantage because her status as a woman often obscures her value
as a person and colleague. 2, A common perception a woman must

opinion). Justice O'Connor voted with the plurality, excusing herself from the portion of the
Chief Justice's opinion that discussed the appropriateness of overruling Roe in some future, as
yet hypothetical case. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment). Justice
Scalia did not even take issue with Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall or Stevens, who went
even further away from overruling Roe than did Justice O'Connor. Id. at 3065 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment).
Because Justice Scalia singled out Justice O'Connor, one cannot determine which of his
comments he believed applied to all of the plurality Justices. For example, Justice O'Connor's
stated rationale for not reconsidering Roe was based upon her belief that the Court should not
decide questions that are not specifically presented by the facts. Id. at 3060-61 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment). This rationale was also the basis for the
plurality's decision not to reconsider Roe. Id. at 3058 (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion).
Nevertheless, Justice Scalia's objection to this position belittled Justice O'Connor alone. He
stated, "Justice O'Connor's assertion ... that a 'fundamental rule of judicial restraint' requires
us to avoid reconsidering Roe,... cannot be taken seriously." Id. at 3064 (Scalia, J., concurring
in part, concurring in the judgment). Continuing, although whether he intended to insult Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justices Kennedy and White, or only Justice O'Connor here is not clear,
Justice Scalia remarked that adherence to this 'Judicial restraint" approach "preserves a chaos
that is evident to anyone who can read and count." Id. at 3065 (Scalia, J., concurring in part,
concurring in the judgment). Finally, he specifically described Justice O'Connor's position as
'irrational." Id. at 3066, n.* (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment). Justice
Scalia's opinion represents a typical response to an opponent's argument when a valid, substantive
response is elusive. Unfortunately, Justice Scalia's attack upon Justice O'Connor reflects the
stereotype that women are "stupid," 'too emotional," and "irrational." For an extensive discussion of Webster and much more flattering view of Justice O'Connor's opinion, see Wardle, "Time
Enough" Webster v. Reproductive Health Services and the Prudent Pace of Justice, 41 FLA.
L. REV. 881 (1989).
25. The University of Florida's recent presidential search provides a prime example of this
problem. Two finalists were selected, a white man and a black woman. "It was truly a win-win
choice between [the black woman] and [the white man]," noted a Miami Herald editorial. Welcome
Win at UF, Miami Herald, Nov. 17, 1989, at 26A. But, in fact, the choice was more one sided.
See, e.g., The Call of the Bull Gator, St. Petersburg Times, Nov. 8, 1989, at 16A ("what some
[alumni] most particularly do not want is a new president who is female and black"); see
also Evans, ChancellorVery Influential in PresidentialChoice, The Independent Fla. Alligator,
Nov. 13, 1989, at 5, col. 3 (The black woman's "gender and race are 'an issue that concerns
many people."') (quoting alumnus Bill Goza); Oliver, 2 EnterHomestretch in Race to Head UF,
Orlando Sentinel, Nov. 9, 1989, at 1, col. 2 ("Several Regents, calling both candidates impressive
and qualified, said the decision will hinge on whose personality better fits the university.").
Under the label of 'personality," the devaluation of the black woman candidate began. See
Lazo, Regents Decide to Hire UF PresidentTuesday, Miani Herald, Nov. 9, 1989, at 26A, col.
3 ("Some alumni have said a she would have problems dealing with UF's old-boy network.")
(emphasis added). The decisionmakers, predominantly white and male, were unable to transcend
their biases and, not surprisingly, translated them into a perceived weakness on the part of the
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overcome is that she was hired because she is a woman, not because
she is the best candidate for the position, though often she is. 26 The
devaluation of her self can be even greater for a woman of color.
The facial diversity definition shows us that the damage to men
of color and women can go much deeper. For example, in the pool of
potential law school faculty are hundreds of candidates (millions, if
you have ever been on an appointments committee) who fit a specific
profile or prototype. 'By prototype, I mean the candidate who
graduates from a national law school, is in the top ten percent of the
class, is a member of law review, preferably an editor or the editor
in chief, is a member of Order of the Coif, and has a federal clerkship.
Candidates with these qualifications meet our common understanding
of excellence.
Some men of color and women in the pool do fit this prototype,
but many others do not. Many reasons might explain why men of
color and women, as groups, generally do not fit this prototype.- The

black woman. In their opinions, the best "fit" was the white male. See Lombardi Picked for
UF President, St. Petersburg Times, Nov. 15, 1989, at B6, col. 3 ("Charles Edwards, Chairman
of the Board of Regents, said [the black woman] 'came very close to being selected. This was
a tough one."'). Apparently, when it became clear that the black woman was equally qualified,
the white male's credentials became more impressive than previously had been thought. See id.
("[The white male] gained the edge because of strong faculty endorsements, more extensive
experience at large public universities[,] and his administrative skills .... "). The regents found
that the white male candidate simply better suited the university's needs. As Chancellor Charles
Reed noted "Anybody that drives a red pickup truck will do okay in Florida." Id.
Like most state employers, the University of Florida prides itself on being an affirmative
action, equal opportunity employer. All of University of Florida's stationery proclaims it. As
Professor Crenshaw astutely noted, "Practically speaking, all companies can now be equal opportunity employers by proclamation alone." Crenshaw, supra note 7, at 1347.
Moreover, women who are hired, particularly in traditionally male jobs, often are under
pressure to conform to traditional female stereotypes. Failure to do so may cost a woman her
job, as it did Ann Hopkins, a senior manager at Price Waterhouse. See Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989), on remand, 58 U.S.L.W. 2669 (D.D.C. 1990). Although highly
successful and well-respected by her clients, partners at Price Waterhouse were reluctant to
make Ms. Hopkins a partner because she was not feminine enough for them. Id. at 1782-83.
After a long legal battle, however, Judge Gesell recently held that Price Waterhouse discriminated against Ms. Hopkins on the basis of sex and ordered that she be made a partner effective
July 1, 1990. Price Waterhouse, 58 U.S.L.W. at 2669.
26. Many men of color and women also experience this sense of being hired, being admitted,
and generally being valued only because of their sex or color and not because of their talents.
Carter, Racial Preferences? So What?, Wall St. J., Sept. 13, 1989, at A20, cols. 3-6.
27. See generally Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745,
1768-71 (1989) (analyzing the effect of racial difference on scholarly influence and prestige in
legal academia). In a previous essay I explored some reasons for the low graduation rate of
college athletes, most of whom are men of color. See Rush, Touchdowns, Toddlers, and Taboos:
On Paying College Athletes and Surrogate Contract Mothers, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 549 (1989). I
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most obvious reason that many men of color and women do not have
"excellent" credentials, as we commonly understand that term, is because of the history of race and sex discrimination in this country.
Less obviously, a woman may attend a less prestigious law school
because she has no other option available without relocating her family.
Similarly, she may choose to forego an opportunity to participate in
law review because of her familial obligations. We might think that
her decisions to forego professional opportunities are her choice, but
in reality we also value family commitment. Women and men are
socialized to expect w omen to make any career aspirations secondary
to familial obligations. This reality should not mean that if a woman
attends a less prestigious law school, for example, that she should be
locked out of postions in legal academe at prestigious law schools.
Reviewing her total r6sum6, perhaps she deserves that initial twentyminute interview to see whether she is, in fact, an excellent candidate.
Facial diversity, then, may tend to emphasize a woman's sex or
race in a negative way and may create collegiality problems. For
example, just as cries of reverse discrimination are eroding affirmative
action plans,2 a facial diversity plan may cause some faculty to believe
that qualified white men will be displaced unfairly. Thus, even a man
of color or a woman who fits the prototype and is hired onto a faculty
must overcome any hostility directed at him or her if, in fact, it was
race or sex that tipped the balance in his or her favor over a qualified
white man.2
Alternatively, we should move away from the prototypical qualifications and measure excellence in ways that will reflect the achievements of many men of color and women. In this manner, we can
include them in the pool. As we follow this process, we should ensure
we do not sacrifice excellence for diversity. However, we must understand that a commitment to facial diversity alone does not alter our
continuing commitment to excellence. Measuring excellence by valuing

also compared and contrasted the plight of the college athlete who fails to graduate with that
of women in this country who are more likely to achieve positions of less wealth and power
than those positions that men achieve. Id. at 598. Recent debates over the questions of paying
college athletes and surrogate contract mothers provided a timely opportunity to analyze some
of the racism and sexism that surrounds those issues.
28. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973), vacated and remanded per curiam as moot,
416 U.S. 312 (1974).
29. Crenshaw, supra note 7, at 1339 (critiquing Thomas Sowell's position 'that the growing
popularity of white hate groups is evidence of the instability wrought by improvident civil rights
policies") (footnote omitted).
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different criteria does not mean we are lowering standards3 °
Moreover, in my opinion, facial diversity not only will fail, but will
do more harm than good, if it results in lowering standards. The
greatest harm most likely would befall the candidates themselves.
Imagine the potential isolation and diminished self-esteem 31 a man of
color or a woman who is hired under this philosophy faces if most
faculty members doubt the value of this philosophy.
Now that I have portrayed facial diversity in its worst light, let
me describe what I see as some of its advantages. First, facial diversity
ensures that men of color and women are hired. As long as facial
diversity is our definition of diversity, then at least being a man of
color or a woman counts for something in a society that historically
has told us that being a man of color or a woman does not count for
much at all. Equally important, by increasing the representation of
men of color and women on our faculties, we can interact with each
other and overcome many of the common misunderstandings and misconceptions surrounding our differences.
Beyond clarifying misconceptions, by defining diversity to mean
hiring men of color and women, we can demystify and deconstruct
the present power structure that oppresses all people. Institutions of
higher education are the ideal places for beginning this process of
transcending the white male norm and evidencing, not just a tolerance
of, but a genuine appreciation for men of color and women. The educated rule in our society; the educated are the powerful. Among the
educators, then, we must include men of color and women.

30. As Professor Stephen Carter explained in speaking about racial preferences in college
admissions, "If one supports racial preferences in professional school admissions, one must be
prepared to treat them like any other preference in admissions. One must believe that they
make a difference, that is, that some students would not be admitted if the preferences did not
exist." Carter, supra note 26, at A20, col. 4. Moreover, he continued, "[H]aving said it, [affirmative action candidates] must be ready with a list of what [they] have accomplished with the
opportunities that the preferences provided." Id. Because excellence remains our goal, men of
color and women who are hired but who lack traditional qualifications should have no trouble
meeting Professor Carter's challenge.
31. Carter, Loving the Messenger, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMANITIES 317, 331 (1989). Although
Professor Carter's article focuses upon racial preferences, it also applies, in my opinion, to
affirmative action preferences for women. Carter noted,
It is the peculiar tragedy of racial preferences that in the name of improving the
position of the group, they make it difficult for individual members of the group
to be sure of what they have done .... Can we tell whether anything is earned?
Can we tell how good we are - or if we are any good at all? Where is the work,
the gain, the self-respect that comes from knowledge of individual accomplishment?
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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Facial diversity also will allow law students and society to see men
of color and women in the role of law professor. Unbelievably, some
law students will graduate without having studied with a female professor or a professor of color. They will graduate without a sense that,
in fact, men of color and women are law professors and should be law
professors. Their lack of exposure to professors other than white men
makes the reality of a white male faculty their sole frame of reference
that they are likely to carry into their lives after law school. How
many of our female students or our students of color will aspire to
become law school professors? When our students, especially our white
male students, become responsible for making decisions that affect
the personnel composition of their work spaces, or those of their
clients, upon what model do we suppose they will build?
Thus, undoing some of the harm and restructuring our justice
agenda to include men of color and women are good reasons for adopting facial diversity as the definition that will meet these goals. Alternatively, let me explain why I think diversity, at least at this time,
should not be defined to include either hardship or ideological differences. In my opinion, both of these definitions have the potential to
undo the entire concept of diversity and defeat what I see as the
ultimate purpose for having diversity as a goal.
Let us focus for a moment on hardship diversity. Indisputably,
some white men suffer as outsiders. Many white men may be discriminated against because of characteristics they have that mark them as
different from 'the privileged, able-bodied, heterosexual, Christian,
white man" who represefits the prevalent normative standard to which
we all are compared.1 For example, poor or homosexual white men
generally are less powerful and therefore are perceived to be less
valuable socially than their wealthier or heterosexual counterparts.
Nevertheless, they still possess the basic characteristics that make
them part of the present normative standard. They are men, not
women; they are white, not men of color. Their maleness and whiteness
alone empower them in ways that our present power structure disempowers men of color and women.w

32. Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term - Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARv.
L. REV. 10 (1987).
33. See Dalton, The Faithful Liberal and the Question of Diversity, 12 HARv. WOMEN'S
L.J. 1, 2 (1989) (' ho can doubt, however, that it is the old (white male) guard which has most
to lose in giving up a world view that locates it at the very hub of the universe, protected by
those 'universal' laws which operate for its comfort and advantage?"). See generally C. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987) (on the disempowering of women); Cook, Beyond Critical
Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theology of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 HARv. L.
REV. 985 (1990) (on people of color); Crenshaw, supra note 7.
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At present, if hardship diversity is our primary hiring goal, I fear
that the incentive to hire men of color and women will decrease. I
am not suggesting, even for a moment, that laws preventing discrimination on the basis of hardships, such as handicaps, wealth, or sexual
orientation, are unnecessary, unwanted, or unimportant. I also am
not suggesting that these factors should never be taken into account.
I believe we should be sensitive to and appreciative of differences
among people based upon hardship characteristics. Moreover, hardship
characteristics often are relevant, and, in fact, may be so important
as to be the top priority in a selection process.
Recent events at Gallaudet College offer an illustration. Gallaudet
is a college for the hearing impaired. When the office of the president
became vacant, those responsible for filling the office hired a woman
who was not hearing impaired. The college community rebelled and
called for her resignation. They believed that the president must be
hearing impaired because they believed that only a hearing-impaired
person could adequately represent their interests and the interests of
the institution. The newly appointed woman diplomatically resigned,
and a hearing-impaired white man was appointed.I agree with most members of Gallaudet's community that having
a hearing-impaired president is critical, and I respect the newly appointed woman president for resigning from this prestigious position.
Imagine, however, if Gallaudet's choices had included a hearing impaired man of color or woman. That selection would have been evidence
of an effort to achieve facial diversity. Absent facial diversity as a
goal, I fear the white man with the hardship characteristic will get
the job.
Thus, hiring people with hardship characteristics could retard facial
diversity. However, most people with hardship characteristics (and
who among us would not fit this definition in some way or another6)

34. Gallaudet University Installs Deaf President, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1988, § 1, at 45,
col. 1.
35. The white man may get the job even if facial diversity is a stated goal. See supra note
25 (discussing the University of Florida's presidential search).
36. Hardship diversity might include a staggering number of possibilities. Nevertheless,
hardship is attractive as a definition of diversity because of its holistic approach to diversity.
In other words, basic characteristics of a person, such as gender, race, and ideology, all can,
and probably do, contribute to an individual's hardships. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying
text. Hardship diversity also is attractive because it appreciates that we all have pain and
suffering in common; we all have our stories to tell. Professor Carter, in his article on affirmative
action preferences, stated,
[T]he experiences that make us different do not make us unable to understand or
appreciate one another. Difference is a bridgeable chasm. It is bridged when we
"reach out from one loneliness to another," not in anger, not in frustration, not in
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almost always suffer discrimination. Nevertheless, if hardship diversity is valued over facial diversity, it has the potential to promote the
most fundamental aspect of the status quo - the power of some white
men over everyone else.
Shifting the focus, suppose that ideological diversity on our law
school faculties was our immediate goal. Personally, I find this attractive and appealing, although others may not. Law schools may be
ideal settings for implementing procedures that will help us achieve
ideological diversity. At a minimum, ideological diversity can spark
debates, spur intellectual discussions, and generally motivate us to
think in new and more creative ways. In my opinion, the seeds and
ideas for moving away from the white male hegemony are best articulated and promoted by many people whose ideological beliefs and perspectives, at present, generally are underrepresented or even unrepresented in many of the Academy's law schools.3 7
Thus, striving toward ideological diversity is an attractive goal
that I would like to see us ultimately achieve. For now, however, I
must ask if ideological diversity is possible. If it is possible, ideological
diversity, perhaps even more than hardship diversity, can mean no
diversity at all for men of color and women.
Does human nature thwart the possibility of making ideological
diversity our immediate goal? Fundamentally, we enter into caring
relationships with people who espouse similar philosophies about issues
that are important to us. A healthy sense of self keeps most of us
from engaging in relationships that are combative, belittling, painful,
or discomforting and which offer no hope of compromise and no hope
of affirmation or validation of one's self. For example, as sacred as
marriage is, when a husband and wife reach a point of irreconcilable
differences, we recognize through our divorce laws the untenability
of their continued relationship and set them free from one another.
Thus, a person understandably would choose as a colleague someone
who shares similar values and ideals and who would help the person
achieve his or her professional goals.

hatred, but in love; not lifting the world up by its ears, but touching the world
on its human heart.
Carter, supra note 31, at 329 (footnote omitted) (quoting J. LESTER, LOOK OUT, WHITEY:
BLACK PowER's GON' GET YOUR MAMA! 172 (1968)).

37. How many schools offer a course on feminist jurisprudence or critical race studies?
While the general absence of these courses from our curriculum may not correlate exactly with
the absence of men of color and women to teach them, I would believe the correlation is very
high. But, these absences should not be surprising because many schools do not even offer a
basic critical legal studies course.
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People who share ideological goals not only affirm one another,
they also empower one another. In an ideologically homogeneous
group, members are able to set and effectuate policy goals. The dominant group, in fact, draws upon its dissimilarity from outsiders as a
way to reinforce the group members' similarities.2 The dominant group
needs the continued separateness of the outsiders to maintain its own
cohesion. People who deviate from the group's ideals thus present a
threat to the group's power structure. Again, insiders understandably
might try to keep outsiders out to avoid compromising the insiders'
position of comfort and power.
Thus, in filling up work space, the dominant group may reject
ideological diversity. In fact, consciously or unconsciously, 39 its members may seek out others who share similar ideological beliefs or
deviate only slightly, but tolerably, from them. Often, we call this
hidden factor "collegiality." Unfortunately, collegiality often manifests
ideological homogeneity. As colleagues, we tend to consider ourselves
family, which can tolerate only the slightest disagreements on fundamental issues. The general unwillingness to tolerate or even appreciate
differences that might make us uncomfortable has hurt men of color
and women perhaps more than other groups. Thus, as attractive as
ideological diversity is, I do not think it should be our primary, immediate goal.
Consider the critical legal studies and feminist jurisprudence movements. (Perhaps a similar analysis also might apply to critical race
scholars.) Scholars who identify with the crits and feminists are marginalized within the Academy. If Academy members were committed
to ideological diversity, one would suppose that crits and feminists,
as groups, would not be so devalued by the more traditional scholars.40
Indeed, one would suppose that those traditional scholars who believed
in ideological diversity might appreciate nontraditional ideas and approaches to legal scholarship.
In reality, however, academicians at most schools would be wise
not to identify themselves as crits or feminists. For example, negative
38. See Crenshaw, supra note 7, at 1372 ("[T]he establishment of an "other" creates a bond,
a burgeoning common identity of all non-stigmatized parties - whose identity and interests are
defined in opposition to the other.") (referring to studies by J. KOVEL, WHITE RACISM: A
PSYCHOHISTORY

93-105 (1970)).

39. See Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987).
40. Professor John Merryman reminded me that some crits also devalue traditional scholars.
Although true, the power imbalance between crits and traditional scholars is so great that being
the target of criticism is much more serious for crits. Perhaps someday the power will be
distributed more evenly and the criticisms between the two groups can be viewed as "healthy
intellectual debate."
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sentiment surrounded the works of crit/feminists Professor Drucilla
Cornell at the University of Pennsylvania,'41 Professor Clare Dalton
at Harvard, 4 and Professor Lucinda Finley at Yale. 43 Altogether, they
have published substantial articles in some of the most elite law reviews, including Columbia, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Yale. 4
Drucilla Cornell was voted outstanding teacher at Penn. 45 All of them
have developed national reputations for excellence. Yet, each woman

encountered insurmountable obstacles in her tenure path.
By traditional standards for measuring "tenurability" - scholarship, teaching, and service - one cannot imagine what more any of
these women could have done. I am sure explanations for deficiencies
were offered by each faculty on each woman. Perhaps some of the
criticisms were legitimate. But given the apparent strength of these

women as teachers and scholars, whatever the legitimate criticisms
were, I cannot believe that the deficiencies were "fatal." Perhaps the
deans 4 or most members of the faculties at Harvard, Yale, and Penn

were not secure enough in their own ideological differences from these
women to vote them in as potentially permanent associates. Suffering
from irreconcilable differences, the deans and faculties inappropriately
divorced them.

41. Professor Drucilla Cornell received her law degree from University of Southern California. She now is a full professor at the Yeshiva University, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.
Telephone conversation with Professor Drucilla Cornell (July 12, 1990).
42. Professor Clare Dalton received her B.A. from Oxford University and her LL.M. degree
from Harvard. She has been a full professor at Northeastern since 1988. ASS'N of AMERICAN
LAW SCHOOLS, THE AALS DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS, 1989-90, at 266 (1989) [hereinafter
AALS DIRECTORY].
43. Professor Lucinda Finley received her law degree from Columbia, where she served
as Articles Editor of the Columbia Law Review. After graduation she clerked for Judge Arlin
Adams of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. She has been an associate professor at Yale since
1986 and currently is visiting at Buffalo. Id. at 324.
44. By focusing upon the elite law reviews, of course, I am "buying into" the importance
of the hierarchy for measuring our worth as law professors. But this focus is not mine and not
one I would choose. With that in mind, a list of Professors Cornell's, Dalton's, and Finley's
"elite" scholarship might include the following- Cornell, Toward a Modern Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 291 (1985); Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction
of ContractDoctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997 (1985); Dalton, Unequal Colleagues: The Entrance of
Women into the Professions, 1890-1940 (Book Review), 86 MICH. L. REV. 1346 (1986); Finley,
Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 1118 (1986).

45. Drucilla Cornell received the "Harvey Levin Memorial Award for Teaching Excellence"
in 1988. Telephone conversation with Gary Clinton, Registrar at University of Pennsylvania
Law School (Jan. 10, 1990).
46. See infra note 57 (discussion of Professors Dalton's and Trubels denial of tenure at
Harvard).
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We will never know whether Professors Cornell, Dalton, and Finley
were defeated in their tenure quests simply because their ideologies
differed from traditional scholars. Perhaps their femaleness, and not
their ideological perspectives, hurt them. Like racism, sexism also
works on us unconsciously. 47 Or, perhaps the combination of being a
woman and a nontraditional scholar accounts for the outcomes in their
cases. In any event, what happened to these prominent women forces
me to ask whether tenure space exists in the Academy only for the
Duncan Kennedys, the David Trubeks, and the Mark Tushnets.
Before I am misunderstood, let me add two very important caveats.
First, Professors Cornell, Dalton, and Finley, and many other women
who identify themselves as crits or feminists, not only are "making
it" in the Academy, but they are making the Academy stronger because of their presence. In addition to Professors Cornell, Dalton, and
Finley, who are now at Cardozo, Northeastern, and Buffalo, respectively, I think Professors Martha Fineman,48 Ann Scales, 49 Robin
West,w5 and Patricia Williams 51 offer some of the best evidence of this
reality. Moreover, the increasing number of visitorships by feminists
at high echelon schools - and the appointment of Catharine MacKinnon
as a tenured professor at the University of Michigan- are some evidence that crits and feminists are being taken more seriously.

47. Lawrence, supra note :39.
48. See Fineman, ChallengingLaw, EstablishingDifferences: The Futureof Feminist Legal
Scholarship, 42 FLA. L. REv. 25 (1990). Professor Martha Fineman received her law degree
from the University of Chicago. She then clerked with Judge Swygert on the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals. She has been a full professor at the University of Wisconsin Law School
since 1986. AALS DIRECTORY, supra note 42, at 323.
49. See Scales, Feminists in the Field of Time, 42 FLA. L. REv. 95 (1990). Professor
Ann Scales received her law degree from Harvard Law School. She has been a full professor
at University of New Mexico School of Law since 1986. AALS DIRECTORY, supranote 42, at 721.
50. See West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the Promise of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 FLA. L. REV. 45 (1990). Professor Robin West received her law degree from the
University of Maryland School of Law and a J.S.M. from Stanford University. She has been a
full professor at the University of Maryland School of Law since 1988. AALS DIRECTORY, s8tpra
note 42, at 852.
51. See Williams, Fetal Fictions: An Exploration of Property Archetypes in Racial and
Gendered Contexts, 42 FLA. L. REV. 81 (1990). Professor Patricia Williams received her law
degree from Harvard Law School where she was articles editor for the Black Law Journal.
She currently is an associate professor at University of Wisconsin Law School. AALS DIRECTORY, supra note 42, at 864.
52. Visiting professorships also have their down-side. For example, some high echelon
schools are falling into a pattern of hiring women to visit without extending offers to stay.
Visitorships thus allow schools to fulfill their responsibilities to hire men of color and women
without really hiring them.
53. Professor Catharine MacKinnon received her law degree from Yale Law School. She
will begin her tenure at the University of Michigan in the fall semester of 1990. Telephone
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Second, the importance of the works of Professors Duncan Kennedy,5 David Trubek,5 and Mark Tushnets cannot be overstated. As
leaders of the critical legal studies movement, these men and many
others, including men of color, have made invaluable contributions to
legal scholarship. They undoubtedly suffer discrimination because of
their "deviant" perspectives on law. For example, Professor Trubek
also was denied tenure at Harvard, supposedly because of his crit
status.57 Ironically, both the quality of the crits' scholarship and the
depth of prejudice against them have made it "easier" for all of us to
find space somewhere within the Academy. As one of my friends once
said to me, "Yes, you are weird, but at least you aren't a crit." (So
much for one person's view of the world who believes it is "better"
to be a feminist than a crit!?)
By comparing the "circumstantial defeat" of Professors Cornell,
Dalton, and Finley with the ultimate "success" of Professors Kennedy,
Trubek, and Tushnet at the higher echelon schools (Harvard, Wisconsin, and Georgetown, respectively), I merely am trying to make the

point that getting tenure, particularly at high echelon schools, seems
to be easier for white men whose ideologies differ from the group's

norm than for women with nontraditional ideologies. Although the
situation is improving, if diversity focuses upon ideological differences,

conversation with a clerk of the dean's office at the University of Michigan Law School (June
25, 1990).
54. Professor Duncan Kennedy received his law degree from Yale Law School and is currently a full professor at Harvard Law School. AALS DIRECTORY, supra note 42, at 478.
55. Professor David Trubek received his law degree from Yale Law School. He is a full
professor at University of Wisconsin Law School and serves as the Director of the Institute
for Legal Studies. AALS DIRECTORY,supra note 42, at 820.
56. Professor Mark Tushnet received a J.D. and M.A. from Yale Law School. He is currently
a full professor at Georgetown University Law Center. AALS DIRECTORY, supra note 42, at
822.
57. Kaplan, So-Called Crits vs. Traditionalists:Battle at HarvardLaw Over Tenure, NATL
L.J., June 22, 1987, at 3, col. 1. Over two-thirds of the faculty supported Professor Trubek,
including many more traditional legal scholars who constituted a majority of the Harvard faculty.
Some faculty considered Trubek's rejection, and the earlier denial of tenure to crit Professor
Clare Dalton, an affront to academic freedom. Professor Laurence Tribe, a traditional liberal
constitutional scholar unconnected to the crit movement, indicated his belief that ideology had
dictated hiring decisions. Id.; see also Kaplan, Academic Freedom in Peril? Letter Calls for
HarvardProbe, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 10, 1987, at 3, col. 1. Harvard President Derek Bok denied
tenure to Trubek despite the 30-8 vote by the Harvard law faculty in his favor. For the first
time, Bok had rejected a recommendation by the law faculty. In response, over 200 law professors, including traditional legal scholars, from 17 law schools, signed a letter requesting the
American Association of University Professors, the Association of American Law Schools, and
the American Bar Association investigate whether Trubek and Dalton were denied tenure
because of their crit status. Id.
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I fear that few nontraditional scholars will be hired and tenured. 5
And, when they are hired, I fear that the few slots they are given
will be filled by white male nontraditional scholars and that this will
be seen as sufficient to satisfy diversity goals.
I fear that ideological diversity can become like hardship diversity,
a means for hiring white men. If this process occurs, the concept of
diversity means virtually nothing at all for men of color and women.
If we continue to hire white men, we come no closer to what I perceive
to be the ultimate goal: to move away from the white male hegemony.
In trying to understand diversity by breaking it down as I have,
I do not mean to suggest that diversity is a simple concept or that it
is easily divided into parts. I also have reservations about making
facial diversity a primary goal. First, I would be unrealistic and naive
to posit that ideology does not guide our hiring choices. Hiring by
ideology, after all, is how the status quo is maintained. My preference
for facial diversity is itself an ideology, as many of my colleagues have
noted. Perhaps we should openly discuss a candidate's ideology. Certainly, if ideological diversity were the stated goal, discussions about
a candidate's approach to legal analysis would be acceptable. In fact,
candidates' deviations from traditional analysis would be talked about
because of the positive qualities they possess in terms of meeting the
diversity goals. Imagine this sentiment resounding in the hallways:
"Isn't this wonderful. One candidate is a radical feminist who fills our
teaching needs in torts. According to her application, she also wants
to teach a seminar on feminist jurisprudence, which would add depth
to our curriculum. I think we should interview this woman before we
lose her to another school."
But right now, most of us tend to hide our personal preferences
for candidates with particular ideologies. My guess is that we are
timid about making such revelations for at least three reasons. First,
many of us really do not want different people working in our space.
Probably no one will say, "A radical feminist? That makes me too

58. The pretenure probationary period has been characterized as "a time of fear-induced
caution." Markoff, AALS Agenda: Teacher Evaluation, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 8, 1990, at 1, col. 2.
Markoff noted,
'Traditionally, the most common advice given to new law teachers is not to do
anything too unconventional during the first five years," says Dean N. William
Hines of the University of*Iowa College of Law. 'The theory is, you do your school
figures first, then you go to freestyle, and you've got 50 years to freestyle."
Id. at 22. If fear induces caution once a job is obtained, fear must really restrain scholarly work
in preparation for an academic career.
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uncomfortable." Rather, the rationale is probably like the following:
'Well, she only went to Law School X and she wasn't a law review
editor. I don't think we could get her past the faculty. But look at
candidate so-and-so . . . ." The radical feminist is forgotten while
attention is turned to the more ideologically traditional scholar.
Second, for those of us who do want ideological diversity, silence
is a wise strategy. To ourselves we might be saying: "Maybe if we
don't say anything, the others won't realize that she is a feminist, or
at least that she is radical. Maybe if we interviewed her, the faculty
would get to know her, learn about her interests, and really like her.
After meeting her, they might feel that her 'difference' would add a
valuable dimension to the faculty."
As a third possible reason for our commitment to silence, we also
might think that if we express feelings of discomfort or joy regarding
a candidate's ideological leanings, we would destroy the myth of objectivity in the process. "Stick to the paper record, and everyone is
treated equally and fairly. It is irrelevant that she is a radical feminist.
Let's stick to the facts and compare her record with .... .
Thus, at present this tendency to hide our real feelings about
particular candidates' ideological beliefs is an unstated assumption,
broken only by openly acknowledging an attraction to a candidate
because of his or her ideology. Such an open acknowledgment generally
is unthinkable. But we do not ignore ideology. For example, probably
no one at Harvard openly suggested that Professor Randall Kennedy
would be a wonderful addition to the faculty because, not only is he
black, but he also is a traditional scholar.
Currently, Professor Kennedy is being sharply criticized for his
article, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, which recently appeared
in the HarvardLaw Review.5 9 In his article, Professor Kennedy takes
the position that it is incumbent upon scholars of color (and, by analogy,
women),6 to justify claims of race (and sex) discrimination as a personal
matter. 61 Professor Kennedy's thesis is that being a person of color
(or a [white] woman) is an insufficient basis for claiming special insights
into the problems of race and sex discrimination.s Professor Kennedy

59. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1745 (1989); see
Rothfeld, Minority Critic Stirs Debate on Minority Writing, N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1990, § B, at
6, col. 3. A number of scholars responded to Professor Kennedy. See Colloquy: Responses to
Randall Kennedy's Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 103 HARV. L. REV. 844 (1990); see
also Delgado, When a Story is Just a Story: Does Voice Really Matter?, 76 VA. L. REV. 95
(1990).
60. Kennedy, supra note 59, at 1750 n.22.
61. Id. at 1754-55.
62. Id. at 1749.
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supports his thesis by strongly criticizing the works of Professors
Derrick Bell, Richard Delgado, and Mari Matsuda,- whose scholarship
accepts the premise that people of color (and white women) offer a
distinct perspective on restructuring our justice agenda simply because
they are people of color (or women).As my colleague, Professor Anthony Cook, related to me after
attending a conference at which Professor Kennedy presented his comments, members of the audience had sad and disheartened looks on
their faces as Professor Kennedy spoke. As they listened to him speak,
their feelings may have been similar to mine as I read his article. I
felt that Professor Kennedy was attempting to demolish many structures of reform many people have struggled to erect and protect. I
felt that Professor Kennedy wanted me to deny that being a woman
makes any difference with respect to how I see the world. I cannot
do that. Nor do I want to do so. I also am unwilling to believe, as
Professor Kennedy seemingly wants me to believe, that being a woman
or a person of color really is irrelevant in discrimination law without
specific proof. First, history is replete with specifics of race and sex
discrimination. Second, I do not doubt that almost all men of color
and women could provide individual accounts of attacks upon their
worth because they are not white men. Of course, all of us do not
have the same experiences.- But our varied experiences of being
devalued probably do make us feel something - anger, hurt, indignation - but something. We share this disturbance of our peace. Our
quest to regain our senses of calm is reflected in our writings.
So, where does Randall Kennedy fit in? Regardless of how diversity
is defined, and even without a commitment to diversity, Professor

63. Id. at 1746 (citing Bell, Bakke, Minority Admissions, and the Usual Price of Racial
Remedies, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1979); Bell, Minority Admissions as a White Debate, in RACE,
RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW

§ 7.12.1, at 445-48 (2d ed. 1980); Delgado, The Imperial Scholar:

Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature,132 U. PA. L. REV. 561, 566 (1984); Matsuda,
Affirmative Action and Legal Knowledge: Planting Seeds in a Plowed-Up Ground, 11 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 2-4 & n.12 (1984)).
64. Id. at 1746. Professor Kennedy termed the unique perspective of people of color the
"distinctiveness thesis." Id. He defined it as characterized by
the belief (1) that minority scholars, like all people of color in the United States,
have experienced racial oppression; (2) that this experience causes minority scholars
to view the world with a different perspective than their white colleagues; and (3)
that this different perspective displays itself in valuable ways in the work of minority scholars.
Id.
65. See generally E. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN
FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988); Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42
STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990).
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Kennedy probably would be hired by almost any law school faculty.
66
His paper record speaks for itself; he also fits the prototype.
Moreover, by hiring him, a law school might fill a space that otherwise
might be filled by a white male candidate whose ideology is more
sympathetic to men of color and women. And, although Justice O'Connor's appointment to the Supreme Court does not pose the same dilemma - it was her or a conservative man (probably white, because
we already have a black) - it does raise the basic question: Do the
Randall Kennedys and Sandra Day O'Connors do more harm than
good? Although hiring them promotes facial diversity, evidencing an
institution's commitment to diversity however superficial that might
be, hiring them also has the potential ideologically to set back efforts
that many women, men of color, and some white men have made to
move us away from the status quo.
This question presents a dilemma for me, a dilemma for which I
do not have an easy solution. First, I think some good comes from
having the Randall Kennedys and Justice O'Connors in positions of
power. Significantly, they are breaking barriers and making it easier
for us to follow. This argument, of course, is the classic distributive
justice justification for hiring men of color and women. It is similar
to my earlier point that men of color and women need to be seen in
positions of power so that we all can begin to believe that they actually
belong in those positions. 7
Second, and critically important, I also find it imperative that we
realize that not all blacks, not all women, not all of any group, think
alike. How many times is a woman placed on a committee so that she
can present the feminine, not the feminist, view? True facial diversity
disregards ideology, and, ironically, can help us achieve ideological
diversity perhaps better or more efficiently than a direct ideological
diversity approach. This argument is one justification for hiring the
Randall Kennedys.
Third, given the historical oppression of men of color and women,
in reality, most of us do speak with a voice that differs from the voices
of the existing hierarchy. Admittedly, some men of color and women
echo the status quo, or are even reactionary in their ideologies. Gen-

66. See supra text accompanying note 27. Professor Kennedy graduated from Yale Law
School and served as the Note and Topic Editor of the Yale Law Journal. Following his
graduation, he clerked for Judge Skelly Wright, United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit, and then for United States Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall.
AALS DIRECTORY, supra note 42, at 479.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
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erally, however, I think Professors Bell, Delgado, and Matsuda are
correct. Hiring a man of color or a woman increases the statistical
probability that the views of the existing group will be more ideologically diverse.
Perhaps the best evidence of this point is the scholarship of men
of color and women. Generally, our scholarship raises new perspectives
- the perspectives of these groups. Even the critical legal studies
movement "ghettoized" these groups at the beginning of its journey.rs
Thus, I am forced to ask, "Where were the perspectives of men
of color and women before we started presenting them? '69 Could it
be that white men, as a group, were able all along to see the world
the way many men of color and women see it and that they simply
chose to write their articles and essays without regard to those insights? If these speculations are true, then why has their way of
viewing the world been the only way that is worth writing about?
These possibilities seem too incredible to me. I prefer to believe that,
in fact, much of the outsiders scholarship presents something new,
something most white men - and perhaps many white women, and
maybe even some people of color - previously did not understand or
explore because "social dominance becomes invisible." 70 Social dominance is the hallmark of hegemony.71 Admittedly, men of color and
women only recently have held positions in the Academy that have
allowed us the forum even to present our perspectives.
In reality, the selection process for hiring faculty members is a
combination of many factors. I think the world would be a better place
if the Academy had greater representation of men of color and women
on its faculties. Facial diversity, then, best promotes the goals that
I would like us to aspire and achieve.
Finally, by adopting facial diversity and the goals behind that definition of diversity, I am not suggesting that white men should never

68. Menkel-Meadow, FeministLegal Theory, CriticalLegal Studies, and Legal Education
or "The Fem-Crits Go to Law School", 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 61, 63 (1988); see also, Crenshaw,
supra note 7; Delgado, The EtherealScholar: Does CriticalLegal Studies Have What Minorities
Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301 (1987) (on the exclusion of people of color from the
critical legal studies scholarship).
69. See generally Bell, supra note 63, at 1 (on race); Delgado, supra note 63, at 561 (on
race); Held, Liberty and Equality from a Feminist Perspective, in ENLIGHTMENT, RIGHTS
AND REVOLUTION

214 (1989) (on women).

70. C. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 237 (1989). See generally Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797 (1989).
71. See Crenshaw, supra note 7, at 1350-51, citing A. GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE
PRISON NOTEBOOKS; Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS OF LAW:
A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 18 (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
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be hired or that they cannot speak for women. The Erwin Chemerinskys,7 Richard Chuseds, 73 Kenneth Karsts, 74 and Cass Sunsteins, 75 to
name a few, are brilliant, sensitive scholars making significant efforts
to eliminate sex and race discrimination.76 Thus, I am relieved when
they, or other men, see sex discrimination and challenge it. All too
often, if women are in a group, challenging sexism becomes our respon-

sibility. If we choose not to say anything, often nothing is said. If we
do speak, the significance of what we say often is diminished, probably

because everyone is sick of hearing us allege sexism. But I also
believe that we would not have to continue to raise even the fundamental, basic issues if people were listening carefully to what we and
others are saying. Admittedly, these messages are difficult, and I fear
that some listeners become defensive.
Thus, although men, as a group, cannot know the pain women

experience as women in "their" world, just as whites, as a group,
cannot know the pain people of color experience in "our" world, that

does not mean that men cannot empathize 77 with women or that whites

72. Professor Erwin Chemerinsky received his law degree from Harvard Law School. He
has been a full professor at University of Southern California since 1987. AALS DIRECTORY,
supra note 42, at 230.
73. See Chused, Gendered Space, 42 FLA. L. Rnv. 125 (1990). Professor Richard Chused
received his law degree from the University of Chicago. He has been a full professor at
Georgetown Law Center since 1985. AALS DIRECTORY, supra note 42, at 235.
74. Professor Kenneth Karst received his LL.B. degree from Harvard Law School, where
he served as Book Review Editor for the HarvardLaw Review. He has been a full professor
at U.C.L.A. since 1965. AALS DIRECTORY, supra note 42, at 470.
75. Professor Cass Sunstein received his law degree from Harvard Law School, where he
served as Executive Editor of the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review. He has
been a full professor at the University of Chicago since 1985. AALS DIRECTORY, supra note
42, at 798-99.
76. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 8; Chused, supra note 3; Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 DUKE L.J. 447; Sunstein, Public Values, PrivateInterests, and the Equal Protection
Clause, 1982 Sup. CT. REv. 127.
77. Feminist and other scholarship reveal how any given rule of law is necessarily subjective,
depending upon the rule maker's view of the world. See Minow, supra note 32; Scales, The
Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence:An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373 (1986). Consequently,
the relevance and meaning of empathy with respect to the rule of law is becoming increasingly
important. See Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574 (1987).
"Empathy," as I use it, means going beyond feeling sympathy for someone else. One can
be sympathetic to another's misery without deducing from personal experience what the other
person might be feeling. In contrast, empathy touches upon my personal experiences and renews
my own suffering, which is now focused upon the pain of the other person. Thus, although the
experiences of women, men, people of color, and whites differ because of gender and race
differences, the commonalities of our experiences as humans offer sufficient bridges for us to
feel connected to one another. In this respect, I agree with Professor Randall Kennedy, supra
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cannot empathize with people of color. As men and women, whites
and people of color, we may speak with different voices peculiar to
the ways in which we experience the world. But, the fact that we
have our different voices does not mean that we should not speak at
all on behalf of each other. All of us must speak, and, perhaps more
importantly, all of us must listen.

note 59, at 1815; see also Carter, supra note 31, at 328-29. Appreciating our differences and
establishing connections to one another are what we should strive to achieve. For a different
view of empathy's relevance in legal decisionmaking, see Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling,
and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds?, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 2099, 2124 (1989) (relying
upon empathy instead of the rule of law can result in greater arbitrariness and oppression).
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